Re: direct/indirect perception

[Seetharamakrishnan <seethark@xxxxxxx>]

While we perceive sight through eyes, sound through ears etc... we perceive
the thought itself directly.
There is no other instrument to perceive thought except the awareness
itself. ( i mean the awareness of thought)

But even sight and sound we assume that we are perceiving from outside.
Whereas in actuality the awareness principle is first and all the other
sensations/perceptions are secondary only. (ie secondary to awareness). Even
to say that we perceive nothing we need awareness.

So the strong belief that sensations are from outside is only an illusion.
There is nothing called outside. Even if we call something as outside, it is
thought which classifies as inside and outside.

Thought is very limited and it itself is being perceived. Any story which
thought constructs can only be limited and cannot be Truth.

Regards
Seetharamakrishnan
-----Original Message-----
From: Al Bregman <bregman@HEBB.PSYCH.MCGILL.CA>
To: AUDITORY@LISTS.MCGILL.CA <AUDITORY@LISTS.MCGILL.CA>
Date: Sunday, June 27, 2004 01:18 PM
Subject: Re: direct/indirect perception


>Dear Bruno, Brian, and list:
>
>As I understand Gibson's concept of direct perception, it is more
>than just the claim that the necessary information to form the
>percept is in the stimulus.   It also claims that there is no
>mental representation at all of the stimulus.
>
>The argument goes like this: suppose that the way we know the
>world is by forming a representation of it.  How would that help?
>How would we know what was in the representation?  Would we have
>to form a representation of the representation?  This leads to an
>infinite regress.  An advocate of representations would argue
>that the brain, having formed the representation, could then read
>features off it as required.  Gibson rejects the need for a
>representation at all.  He would argue that the world is its own
>best representation.  Why would you need another one?  The brain
>can read off features, as it needs them, directly from the world,
>not from a representation.  Hence the name "direct perception".
>Furthermore, all the forms of interaction that a representation
>theorist might envision between the rest of the brain and the
>representation, e.g., feedback loops for the control of action,
>can be done directly with the world.  We are so directly coupled
>with the world that we can consider the world and our actions
>upon it as a single system for purposes of modeling.  So we don't
>need a representation.  Of course we know we have representations
>for purposes of thought and imagination, but these processes are
>different from simple perception, which does not use
>representations.
>
>I don't agree with this, but it's the argument for direct
>perception.
>
>Al Bregman
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Bruno L. Giordano" <bruno.giordano@UNIPD.IT>
>To: <AUDITORY@LISTS.MCGILL.CA>
>Sent: Friday, June 25, 2004 6:39 AM
>Subject: Re: direct/indirect perception
>
>
>> Dear Brian, and list,
>>
>> the ecological approach has the merit of directing attention of
>research to the
>> information in the environment, and to how the adaptive animal
>tends to
>> structure the incoming information in terms of properties of
>the environment.
>> These issues are important to me.
>>
>> However, what would we gain the day we will be able to state
>clearly: [1]
>> perception is direct vs. [2] perception is not direct?
>> Which will be the advantages of such knowledge?
>>     Bruno
>>
>> Quoting Brian Gygi <bgygi@EBIRE.ORG>:
>>
>> > Julien,
>> >
>> > I'm not the authority on this, but I always thought that
>"direct
>> > perception" is direct in the sense that all the information
>for
>> > perception
>> > is available in the environment, as opposed to more
>> > information-processing-oriented theories of perception which
>posit that
>> > the
>> > stimulus is impoverished and the job of the sensory system is
>improve it
>> > through the use of prior knowledge and inferences.  So direct
>perception
>> > does not really require intermediate representations or
>memory models,
>> > although I believe only the most hardcore Gibsonians would
>insist on no
>> > role for memory.
>> >
>> > Brian Gygi
>> > East Bay Institute for Research and Education
>> > Martinez, CA
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> Bruno L. Giordano - Ph. D. student
>> Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale
>> Via Venezia 8 - 35131 Padova, Italy
>>
>> currently hosted by:
>>
>> Equipe Perception et Cognition Musicales
>> Ircam-CNRS (UMR 9912)
>> 1 place Igor-Stravinsky
>> F-75004 Paris, France
>>
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